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European Union Security Landscape Post-
9/11: Necessary Protection or Unjustified 
Expansion of a Security Regime?
Colby Mangels  
Introduction
Focusing on changes to the third-pillar of the EU legal structure following 9/11, this 
paper provides analysis into legislative and policy changes in the European Union arising 
out of the events of September 11th. Following the attacks of 9/11, an unprecedented ex-
pansion of the EU-level security capabilities took place within a relatively short amount 
of time (approximately 2002-2006). This change reflected long-standing desires of many 
member-states, as well as EU officials to further utilize the potential of the EU as a basis for 
counter-terrorism and crime prevention through data-sharing agreements, as well as further 
streamlining the justice systems of respective member-states.  The events of 9/11 provided 
the necessary consensus within which individual member-states and EU legislators worked 
to develop and pass legislations and policies which allowed the EU to expand its powers in 
the counter-terrorism arena.
The ambiguity and speed with which some of these new laws and institutions were 
enacted calls for a closer examination of their effectiveness. This study proposes to view 
the manner in which the security apparatus of the EU post-9/11 has allowed the EU to 
reduce the perceived threat of terrorism. Has the EU been able to combat the underlying 
causes of terrorism, or does it remain hampered by problems of miscommunication across 
national borders? Has the streamlining of the EU security apparatus provided member states 
with increased abilities to track down and arrest terror-suspects? Finally, has this legislation 
resulted in higher conviction rates of terrorists, or are the wrong individuals being targeted?
The U.S. approach to intergovernmental cooperation in the ‘war on terror’ was com-
prised of two main categories. The first was the visible increase in U.S. requests for active 
participation by key European allies (namely the UK, Germany, France, Spain and Italy) 
in war zones such as Afghanistan. This was often negotiated on the side of NATO troop 
deployment figures, as U.S. officials believed certain actors were not committing troops to 
military actions in the same proportion as their relative economic size and political power 
9
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denotes1. Such requests have continued to solicit repeated disagreements between the U.S. 
and certain allies, often resulting in very public outbursts on both sides2.  
The second aspect to the U.S. war on terror concerned the call for increased coopera-
tion, which generally was met not on an individual basis of agreements between individual 
European states and the U.S. government as had previously been the case, but on the su-
pranational level of the EU, where the ratification of cooperation treaties could be simpler 
and have a broad-reaching effect across all of the member states of the European Union3. 
Paramount among the differences between U.S. and European conceptions of com-
bating terrorism has remained the focus on conventional military vs. policing measures4. 
While the U.S. experience with terrorism, and perhaps speculatively, its reliance on con-
ventional military tactics, have caused it to view terror as a military challenge that can 
be solved through traditional ‘campaign-style’ wars with counter-terror tactics, European 
forces have taken the approach of preferring to strengthen domestic and European Commu-
nity security forces in order to prevent future attacks5. While it remains speculative in nature 
to determine the sole cause for these two strategies, two hard facts provide a starting point 
from which one can extrapolate. First, U.S. military budget expenditures, both as a propor-
tion of the U.S. federal budget and in absolute terms, continue to dwarf all other developed 
nations6.  U.S. conventional military technology also provides excellent advantages to U.S. 
forces in searching out and fighting terrorists worldwide7. Second, European nations remain 
constrained either politically, technologically, or financially to embark in global unilateral 
military campaigns against non-state actors8. European reliance on U.S. conventional mili-
taries has dated back to the Cold War and the foundation of NATO. European forces have 
shown technical and managerial inadequacies during conflicts such as the Yugoslavian civil 
war and the Kosovo-Serbian conflicts. Furthermore, certain countries (such as Germany) ei-
ther have constitutional restraints on foreign military campaigns9, or high levels of domestic 
opposition against foreign military interventions10. 
It remains without question to conclude that U.S. policies and political negotiations 
had a noticeable effect on the development of European security policies post 9/1111. How-
ever, it can be argued that U.S. pressure for compliance was to an extent constrained within 
1 McGuire, Steven and Michael Smith. “The European Union and The United States.” Palgrave Macmillan. 2008. 
243.
2 <http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/01/24/france.germany.rumsfeld/index.html> <http://www.
cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/01/22/sprj.irq.wrap/>
3 Archick, Kristin. “U.S.-EU Cooperation Against Terrorism.” Congressional Research Service Report for Con-
gress. Order Code RS22030. August 2007.
4 Larrabee, Steven and Julian Lindley-French.  “Revitalizing the Transatlantic Security Partnership: An Agenda for 
Action.” Rand Corporation and Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2008, 33.
5 McGuire, Steven and Michael Smith. “The European Union and The United States.” Palgrave Macmillan. 2008. 
243-245.
6 CIA World Factbook, 2009.
7 McGuire, Steven and Michael Smith. “The European Union and The United States.” Palgrave Macmillan. 2008. 
239.
8 Menon,, Anand. “Empowering Paradise? The ESDP at Ten.” International Affairs 85:2. 2009. 230, 234.
9 “Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany.” German Bundestag Administration. Berlin. 2008.
10 Menon,, Anand. “Empowering Paradise? The ESDP at Ten.” International Affairs 85:2. 2009. 236.
11 Archick, Kristin. “U.S.-EU Cooperation Against Terrorism.” Congressional Research Service Report for Con-
gress. Order Code RS22030. August 2007. 3.
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a larger force of European integration and a search for identity12. The ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty developed the third pillar of Justice and Home Affairs within the EU. 
As the JHA developed itself following Maastricht, it was constrained by the wariness of 
member-states to transfer power regarding defense and security to the European Union. 
The developments of 9/11 provided JHA and the European Commission with the political 
capital needed to justify the expansion of a security apparatus on the supranational level. 
As the U.S. redefined its intergovernmental security and intelligence network in hopes of 
improved data sharing and cooperation, European security policy developed as a quest for 
cooperation across member-states themselves, as opposed to across governmental organiza-
tions, thereby paving the way for new institutions and policies.  
While this security expansion represents the unique approach of the EU towards mod-
ern-day counter-terrorism and security, it raises numerous questions concerning its impli-
cations for civil and privacy rights of citizens, as well as its ability to remain effective in a 
rapidly changing security environment. Continued secrecy in negotiations between the EU 
and U.S. concerning data-sharing agreements has resulted in speculation about the types of 
information which could be transferred and viewed by the two partners13. 
Streamlining the System
The impetus for a new, streamlined security apparatus came in short form following 
the terror attacks of 9/11, on September 21, 2001 when the European Union Council of 
Ministers met to declare their condemnation of the attacks14. Within this announcement lay 
the framework for future security establishments. On June 13, 2002 the Council of Ministers 
adopted a framework, which provided for the establishment of a common European Arrest 
Warrant as well as a common legal definition of terrorism and terrorist acts within the EU15. 
Adoption of the EAW was preceded by the establishment of EUROJUST in February 2002, 
which provided a means for justice systems across Europe to share information and collabo-
rate on transnational court proceedings as well as international criminal proceedings16. The 
EU institution of Europol was given extensive powers to combat and monitor terrorism 
within the EU, and across member state borders17. These three expansions (the EAW, the 
establishment of EUROJUST and the expansion of Europol powers) created a framework 
within which the future expansion of EU-level security powers was made possible through 
increased EU capabilities to monitor and intervene in the justice systems of member states.
Furthermore, since September 23, 2001, the EU had been cooperating with the 
U.S. Treasury Department to transfer personal data from financial transactions linked to 
12 McGuire, Steven and Michael Smith. “The European Union and The United States.” Palgrave Macmillan. 2008. 
244-245
13 http://www.europolitics.info/ep-vote-against-swift-agreement-sparks-enthusiasm-and-anger-art262201-40.
html
14 Council Document 12019/01
15 Council Document 2002/584/JHA
16 Council Document 2002/187/JHA
17 Archick, Kristin. “U.S.-EU Cooperation Against Terrorism.” Congressional Research Service Report for Con-
gress. Order Code RS22030. August 2007. 2.
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the Belgian corporation Society for Worldwide Inter-bank Financial Telecommunication 
(SWIFT)18. The agreement surrounding SWIFT was kept largely in secret following 9/11. 
The primary goal of the SWIFT agreement was to transfer personal data arising from trans-
Atlantic financial transactions to the Treasury Department’s Terrorist Finance Tracking Pro-
gram. This information primarily included financial information such as account numbers 
and bank addresses, names, telephone numbers and personal addresses. TFTP officials have 
stated that data collected from SWIFT cannot be used to try persons unless the crime is 
linked to terrorism19. Upon the signature of a new SWIFT agreement in 2007, U.S. Treasury 
and EC authorities revealed that data received by the Treasury Department consisted of 
completed financial transaction messages and their adhering details. Since the beginning of 
its cooperation in 2001, civil rights groups as well as members of the European Parliament 
have repeatedly protested that the SWIFT data transfers do not conform to the Data Protec-
tion Directive, which specifically prohibits transfers of personal data from the EU to third 
countries20. Furthermore, Working Party 29 (the independent advisory board to the Com-
mission) declared that SWIFT had violated Data Protection Directive codes concerning the 
transfer of private information21. EC officials claim that it is very unlikely for such data to 
have been used in a manner that would have unnecessarily breached privacy and continue to 
defend the cooperation. The SWIFT agreement has undergone two revisions, one in 2007, 
following public disclosure due to press investigations, and one in 2009 following the Lisbon 
Reform. Following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the EP disbanded the SWIFT agree-
ment until further notice on February 11, 2010 by voting to disband the program22. 
Data Retention Directive
With its establishment in March, 2006, the Data Retention Directive allowed for the 
Union to utilize new types of data to track and capture terrorists. Primarily, it requires each 
member-state to store electronic data in the form of “traffic data” arising from mobile phone 
communications. Data necessary to trace and identify the source of a communication by 
telephone is defined as the calling number and the address and name of the subscriber23. 
Furthermore, data to determine the destination of a mobile phone communication is stored 
in the form of the numbers dialed and used, as well as the numbers of routed calls, and the 
name and address of the subscribed user on the receiving end of phone calls. This is accom-
panied with data required to identify the date, time and duration of a communication, the 
type of equipment used, and the physical location of the parties involved at the time of their 
18 Council Documents 13689/02, 13996/02, 13696/02
19 Council Document 10741/1/07 Rev. 2
20 Peers, Steven. “The Exchange of Personal Data between Europol and the USA.” Statewatch Analysis No. 15. 
2002. <www.Statewatch.org>
21 Directive 95/46/EC, Article 8, October 24th, 1995
22 http://www.europarl .europa.eu/news/exper t/infopress_page/019-68675-039-02-07-902-
20100209IPR68674-08-02-2010-2010-false/default_en.htm
23 Council Directive L105/54, Article 5
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communications. 
The DRD further expands European security officials’ ability to view data to include 
that of Internet communications. The scope of data collected is basically the same as for 
telecommunications, with the collection of log-in and log-out data, location, identification 
of users, and duration of communications permitted. It is important to note that none of the 
data stored within the DRD is allowed to pertain to the content of the message itself, merely 
the surrounding “traffic data”. Data collected under the DRD is stored by member-states for 
a minimum of one year, and for a maximum of two years. While under state storage, the data 
is capable of being readily accessed by any member of a European security force24.
Use of the DRD as a European standard for data collection and storage has expanded 
the powers of Eurojust in two major ways. First, within this new framework, Eurojust con-
tinues to maintain its position as facilitator of inter-EU communications. With expanded 
observation by each member-state, Eurojust is now responsible for the transfer and sharing 
of this data between member-states25. This gives Eurojust the ability to view virtually all of 
the information collected within this agreement. Second, Eurojust is now the regulatory 
body, determining the effectiveness of each member-state. Effectiveness is based off of statis-
tics each member-state collects according to the number and type of information collected. 
Relationship to Eurojust
In attempting to streamline the judicial process across member-state borders in the EU, 
the Data Exchange Policies Directive outlines data to be transferred from member-states to 
Eurojust for the support of criminal judiciary proceedings26.  Data to be transferred to Eu-
rojust is comprised of: (1) data which identify the person, group or entity which is the focus 
of an investigation or prosecution, (2) the offence concerned and its specific circumstances, 
(3) information about final convictions for terrorist offenses and the specific circumstances 
surrounding the offenses, (4) links with other relevant cases, and (5) requests for judicial as-
sistance.27   
Expanding upon the Data Exchange Policies Directive is the Terrorism Information 
Exchange Directive of December 200528. This directive outlines information to be trans-
ferred to Europol and Eurojust from member-states in the role of fighting terrorism. In rela-
tion to Eurojust, information to be transferred is generally that which surrounds instances 
of criminal acts of terror. Such data includes descriptions of types of crime, as well as all 
pertinent information and evidence to the criminal proceeding.  Any evidence uncovered as 
the result of a criminal proceeding is required to be transferred to Eurojust. 
Both of these directives relate back to the Data Retention Directive in their legal 
24 Council Directive L105/54, Articles 6/7
25 Council Decision 2002/187/JHA
26 JHA Press Release 2626th Council Meeting, 2004
27 JHA Press Release 2626th Council Meeting, 2004, 16
28 Council Directive 2005/671/JHA
European Union Security Landscape Post-9/11
Colby Mangels Georgia	Institute	of	Technology14
scope. By defining a broad range of criminal issues for which a transfer of all relevant data to 
Eurojust is necessary, the Data Exchange Policies Directive and the Terrorism Information 
Exchange Directive both specify a range of data to be sent to Eurojust that also relate to the 
DRD. As the DRD requires states to collect all data on telecommunications and Internet 
email communications for the primary purpose of preventing acts of terrorism and both 
of the above-mentioned directives require member-states to send all pertinent information 
regarding criminal acts to Eurojust, much of the information collected under the DRD can 
be interpreted to fall into the category of one of these other directives. Interpretations within 
this manner can allow for Eurojust to effectively utilize expansions pertaining to member-
states’ data collection regimens, in order to expand its own capabilities in the realm of data 
storage.
The European Arrest Warrant
The EAW has been able to streamline the inner-EU extradition system by providing a 
new method of transferring wanted criminals. Its adoption in June, 2002 by the Council of 
Ministers was generally viewed as a way to combat criminal activities which were increas-
ingly becoming international in scope.29  Based on new definitions of cross-border coopera-
tion, member-states are now subject to carrying out an issued EAW unless the member-state 
in which the warrant is to be executed can find an objectionable grounds to it (i.e. if the 
state to which the wanted person is to be transferred still carries the death penalty). The 
EAW allows member-states to issue a single warrant for both the arrest and extradition of 
the wanted person (Articles 3 and 4). The EAW utilizes the integrated Schengen Informa-
tion System in order to issue the warrant to another member-state, allowing for the rapid 
dispersal of the EAW across the Union.
The EAW has continued to play an important role not only in the arrest and extradi-
tion of individuals, but also in the abilities of member-states to cooperate through improved 
information-sharing and situational awareness. This cooperation has also been facilitated by 
Europol, which assists in issuing EAW warrants (if not possible in either the member-states 
or in the Schengen Information System). It also continues to supply member-states with a 
shared database through which information can be shared in a timely fashion.
Sitcen
Following the 2004 Madrid train bombings, the Commission set out to establish an 
institution which would be responsible for monitoring and preventing organized criminal 
threats to the Union. The result was the institution named Sitcen, which was placed under 
control of Europol in 2005 and was charged with monitoring and preventing threats through 
information gathering and intelligence. Often referred to in press reports as “the CIA of 
29 Council Decision 2002/584/JHA
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the European Union”30,  Sitcen has faced multiple difficulties in effectively carrying out its 
surveillance, while respecting the fundamental rights of EU citizens.
By 2007 the Council had adopted 75 policy recommendations by Sitcen to further 
prevent perceived acts of terrorism31. These policy recommendations were supported by 
the findings of Terror Threat Assessment reports, produced by Europol. Europol uses data 
from individual member-states to support this type of data collection, reporting on the lat-
est trends and arrests of terror suspects and groups within Europe. Sitcen then developed its 
reports and policy recommendations based off of the Europol-assembled data, and further 
used it to warrant future investigations. Among the recommendations made by Sitcen to the 
Council Working Group were those concerning reducing threats caused by Islamic terror 
networks using the Internet, reducing the threat of terrorism on plane traffic, as well as ad-
dressing the increase of North African terror networks within Europe. Many of these policy 
recommendations were then transferred into Council recommendations for member-states 
in order to reduce threats in these fields of competency. 
While Sitcen remains primarily fixated on performing surveillance and analyzing data, 
it has also developed several research programs within the context of EUROPOL and Com-
mission oversight. The project with perhaps the greatest number of implications for the Eu-
ropean security scene is that of INDECT. The concept for INDECT relies upon construct-
ing a new type of search engine, one that is capable of identifying what INDECT designers 
have determined as “abnormal behavior.”32 This new type of search engine combines direct 
searches of images and videos based on watermarked contents with the storage of meta-data 
in digital watermark form, thereby allowing for a system programmer to determine the 
specifications of the individual to be searched. By using a variety of informational sources 
such as Internet, video and audio files, INDECT plans to compare facial, voice, and sound 
recognition models to identify targets. This information can then be quickly relayed to other 
police agencies within the EU in order to determine likely suspects. Despite this apparent 
ability of INDECT to hone in on specific targets, the ramifications of its proposed use in the 
domestic police forces of Europe has raised a series of questions and concerns from privacy 
advocates.
It is particularly the ability of the INDECT system to observe citizens across the EU 
which continues to provide privacy advocates with support to their claims that INDECT 
violates their rights to privacy. The ability of Brussels-based technocrats to potentially wield 
the power of one of the greatest single-interfaced systems ever developed for the purpose of 
domestic surveillance has not been met with continual support across the Union member-
states. Primary resistance and awareness has been based in Britain, as newspapers and maga-
30 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1042491/Fears-Brussels-plans-European-CIA-force-
Britain-share-security-secrets.html
31 Council Directive 7261/07
32 http://www.indect-project.eu/
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zines have published several investigative articles into the nature of the INDECT project.33 
Despite growing interest, Sitcen officials as well as INDECT developers have remained rela-
tively reserved when it comes to describing the implications of the system. Sitcen continues 
to emphasize the trial nature of the project, as well as potential alterations to the system 
before the end of the grant period in 201434. 
Results on Combatting Terrorism
With the formation of The Hague Program and the expansion of Europol in 2004 and 
2005 came the first comprehensive attempt by the Council and Commission to develop 
regular reports on the threat of terrorism to Europe. Europol was charged with issuing 
regular reports on the threats of terrorism to the EU. These reports have been developed 
along with member-state cooperation and are based on figures of arrests, convictions and 
investigations within each member-state. While certain member-states have refrained from 
submitting all of the information requested of them by Europol, the reports nevertheless 
remain an integral part in determining current trends concerning terrorism in the Union35. 
Initial reports in 2007 and 2008 showed how the arrest rates of terrorism suspects had 
rapidly risen in relation to previous years. In 2007, 1,044 arrests of terrorism suspects were 
made, a 48% increase since 200636. 2008 also witnessed a large increase in terrorism related 
arrests compared to 2006 and prior years with 1,009 terror-related arrests37. Member-states 
interviewed and surveyed by Europol reported that new legislation regarding data sharing 
and cross-border cooperation had improved the ability of police forces to pursue leads and 
make arrests. 
While the rate of arrests of suspects of terror-related crimes increased in many mem-
ber-states in recent years (especially in France and Spain), the conviction rates of many of 
these cases continue to fall. In 2007 and 2008, the majority of suspects arrested were accused 
of “membership in a terrorist organization.” However, Europol officials and some scholars 
claim that while legislation until this point has greatly improved cross-border cooperation 
in ascertaining intelligence and investigating suspects, the ability of terrorists to operate in 
small, semi-independent cells has enabled them to continuously remain one step ahead of 
legislative acts, attempting to reign them in38. As terrorists continue to operate in seemingly 
isolated groups, legislation of a previous standing nature remains inadequate to provide the 
needed scope for modern day trials. 2008 arrest records reflect a new approach to fight-
ing terrorism: arresting suspects on charges of financing terrorism as opposed to charges of 
membership in the organization itself. 
33 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/6210255/EU-funding-Orwellian-artificial-intelligence-plan-to-
monitor-public-for-abnormal-behaviour.html
34 http://cordis.europa.eu/fetch?CALLER=FP7_PROJ_EN&ACTION=D&DOC=4&CAT=PROJ&QUERY
=011f30e52539:b685:00e1e967&RCN=89374
35 “EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report [2007, 2008, 2009].” Europol Corporate Communications. 2009. 
<http://www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=publications&language=>
36 “EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2008.” Europol Corporate Communications. 2008. 42. <http://
www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=publications&language=>
37 “EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2009.” Europol Corporate Communications. 2009. 18. <http://
www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=publications&language=>
38 “EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2009.” Europol Corporate Communications. 2009. 14-16. <http://
www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=publications&language=>
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Such changes in patterns of arrest reflect not only the need of law enforcement agen-
cies in Europe to find new routes of investigation, but also the role of Europe in the global 
context of terrorist networks. Europol authorities in the previous two annual reports of 
the terrorist threat to Europe have claimed that the financing and radicalization within 
EU makes for a large “market” for terror networks39. With high rates of second and third 
generation immigrants, Islamic terror networks have been increasingly targeting EU youths 
from their headquarters in other geographical regions. While all Internet traffic relating to 
terrorist recruitment has increased within the past five years, Islamic terror groups are now 
specifically residents of certain European countries. Whereas messages from terror groups 
and terrorist-sponsored websites only appeared in English or Arabic, video and audio mes-
sages conducted by terror groups are now available on the Internet in French and German. 
Conclusion
Expansions of the security apparatus within the European Union have fostered new 
abilities to communicate and streamline the gathering of information between member-
states. The Hague Program has illustrated how the Council and Commission have worked 
to increase abilities at the EU institutional level to move towards preventative measures of 
combating terrorism. Policies suggested under the guise of The Hague Program attempted 
to reduce the loss of speed brought about by legalistic missteps between member-states by 
simplifying and streamlining communication patterns. While advancing new legislation, the 
Commission and Council have worked to either strengthen crime-fighting institutions (Eu-
ropol), or to develop entirely new institutions to facilitate the goals of further legal coopera-
tion (Eurojust). In the case of Europol, the EU has witnessed the creation of an institution 
which allows the EU to act within new boundaries of the Union. With its police training 
college, standing body of officers, liaison officers placed in member-state and U.S. police 
headquarters (FBI), Europol is now able to work within its expanded legal jurisdiction with 
a permanent presence in many locations40.     
Eurojust has facilitated new methods of data transfer between member-states. By pro-
viding the necessary oversight, it has allowed for member-states to transfer judicial and 
pertinent law enforcement information in a manner which allows for quick, standardized 
evaluation among members of the legal and law enforcement agencies across the EU. This 
standardization allows for the minimization of missteps which could potentially divert lim-
ited resources. New legal tools such as the European Arrest Warrant provide for one-size-
fits-all policy to rapidly facilitate the transfer of persons, evidence and documents from one 
member-state to another. However, member-states have conceded that this cooperation 
has placed rising financial burdens on their national judicial systems. With the increases in 
the number of cases prosecuted across member-states, international requirements of many 
cross border cases is becoming increasingly difficult for law enforcement and legal members 
within the judicial systems of member-states to carry out.  
Financial burdens are not the only side effects of this new stream of legislation. While 
Eurojust and Europol have provided means for increased cooperation between member-
states, they have also increased the powers of the EU in the realm of internal security. 
With the instances of the Data Retention Directive and the SWIFT agreements one can 
39 “EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report [2008, 2009].” Europol Corporate Communications. 2008-2009. 
<http://www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=publications&language=>
40 Council Decision 2005/681/JHA
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determine how the scope of new legislation allows for EU officials and member-states to 
monitor information in many of the daily activities of its citizens. The rapid pace at which 
these policies and agreements were designed has affected their often exceedingly broad legal 
scope. With agreements such as SWIFT, the Commission and Council did not take into ac-
count the breadth of the agreement which was designed, whereby citizens were potentially 
not able to control the transfer of their personal data from the EU to a third institution. This 
is revealed in the European Parliament’s repeated opposition to the agreement as well as its 
vote on February 10, 2010 to disband the SWIFT treaty until it could be redefined to reflect 
fundamental EU rights. That such legislation could be carried out prior to the ratification of 
the Lisbon Treaty with minimal Parliamentary participation reveals a flaw in the previous 
EU institutional design. With minimal oversight, in extraordinary circumstances, the Com-
mission and Council were willing and able to design and agree to legislation which is at least 
questionable in its respect of fundamental EU rights. If nothing else, these acts reveal the 
importance of the Lisbon Treaty, its reforms to the EU, and the respective calls for greater 
transparency.
With its move from an ESDP policy advisor, to internal security specialist, Sitcen has 
played a role in proposing new means of thwarting terrorist attacks that have been viewed as 
‘Orwellian’ by many EU citizens. With its proposed implementation of Project INDECT 
into the police forces of individual member-states, Sitcen is offering a means of providing 
security measures that raise serious questions of privacy rights. With the ability to search out 
and direct the capture of suspects from a computer screen supported by CCTV cameras, 
INDECT could potentially violate a number of the civil rights of member-state citizens. 
Furthermore, the applicability of this project to preventing crimes cannot be determined, as 
it merely uses surveillance to enhance searches. Therefore questions can and perhaps should 
be raised as to its necessity within the current goals of The Hague Program framework.  
Ultimately, the question remains as to the overall effectiveness of these new legislative 
acts. Have they worked to prevent crimes? Have they increased the abilities of member-
states to apprehend suspects? Perhaps a definitive answer to these questions is not obtain-
able under any circumstances due to the fluid nature of terrorism and the seeming ease at 
which individuals can empower themselves. However there exists a recurring issue in the 
member-states’ legal procedures against terror suspects. That issue is the increasing difficulty 
of courts to convict suspects on charges related to terrorism. While increased cooperation 
has undoubtedly led to the increase of the number of suspects arrested for terrorism41, the 
number of acquittals in cases of terrorism remains relatively high (30-35% in the years 2007-
2008)42. According to Europol, this results primarily from the inability of judges and judicial 
officials to convict terrorists under existing laws. This relates to the rather ambiguous nature 
of charges of terrorism and the inabilities of member-state law enforcement members to 
collect sufficient evidence for conviction. While the ability of law enforcement officials to 
communicate between each other across member-state borders has improved, there remains 
the impossible barrier of the courtroom in bringing terrorists to justice. Furthermore, the 
question of targeting must be raised: if the acquittal rates in cases of terrorism are so high, 
are the ‘bad guys’ getting away, or are innocent individuals being targeted? These questions 
41 “EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2009.” Europol Corporate Communications. 2009. 11. <http://
www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=publications&language=>
42 “EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2009.” Europol Corporate Communications. 2009. 16. <http://
www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=publications&language=>
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will ultimately be answered only after the elapse of time has allowed for more data to be 
collected on cases operating within this new judicial regime. 
Through the EU policy forum, member-states have moved from taking a reactive to 
a preemptive stance towards terrorism. With each occurrence of large-scale terrorism in 
Europe (9/11, Madrid train bombings 2004, London Underground bombings 2005) there 
exists a new call for ‘never again.’ These incidences have preceded increased expansions of 
the EU into the preemptive sphere of combating terrorism. This prescription of preemptive 
measures has led law enforcement agencies on both member-state and EU-levels to begin 
targeting ever more precise instances and aspects of terrorism. Whereas immediately follow-
ing the 9/11 attacks the EU and member-states were primarily concerned with dismantling 
the relatively tangible ‘terror networks’ operating in Europe, their focus quickly moved 
to targeting the cells of these terror networks themselves. Currently, the forefront of the 
movement for preventative action has led European law enforcement to target the processes 
of recruitment and radicalization. Terror threat reports from Sitcen and Europol continue 
to cite the importance of striking the source of terrorism itself by sniffing out radicalization 
where it most often takes place in prisons, schools, homes, and religious institutions43 44.   
With the EU and member-states moving ever more towards combating the ‘roots’ of 
terrorism, pertinent questions remain to be asked as to how these goals should be achieved. 
While the concept of terrorism possesses varying degrees of clarity, targeting the areas of 
radicalization and recruitment can easily cross over into areas which infringe upon vital civil 
liberties. How do member-states plan to convict persons for such crimes? Is it possible to 
develop legal structures which can encompass the concepts of radicalization while respect-
ing the cherished civil rights of democratic societies?  Finally, is it even possible to prevent 
these crimes? Is terrorism perhaps something EU member-states must live with if they wish 
to maintain their democratic rights? As explained previously in this essay, even within a 
democratic, quasi-republican institution, there exists the potential for the development of 
legislation which stands in conflict with the fundamental right of its citizens. 
By expanding its abilities to capture, share and transfer information the EU and its 
member-states have perhaps validated the saying that “the more one understands, the more 
ignorant one realizes he is.” Despite the vast amounts of knowledge and ability to coordinate 
across member-state borders, EU police forces remain unable to guarantee that they are able 
to prevent terrorism. However, the possibility of the claim that all terrorism is preventable 
remains to be validated. EU attempts to combat terrorism within the Union have thus far 
focused too much on apprehension and largely overlooked the practical, legal and financial 
constraints of individual member-states in trying and convicting the individuals. By further 
expanding a security regime that is already top heavy, the EU threatens to discredit its own 
legitimacy for being the highest institution of democracy with a respect for the fundamental 
rights of its common member-states. Improvements have undoubtedly been provided to 
inter member-state communication and data sharing in the law enforcement realm since the 
attacks of 9/11. However, before further expansion, the Union should develop a common 
consensus from all bodies of its institution as to the long-term goal of combating terrorism 
while keeping in mind that this is a highly fluid and dynamic concept, arising from various 
societal, religious and cultural factors. Any long-term plan should also take into account the 
43 Council Directive 7261/07
44 “EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2009.” Europol Corporate Communications. 2009. <http://www.
europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=publications&language=>
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various ethnic and societal factors within Europe that cause it to be subject to terrorism, 
namely the large percentage of citizens with non-European backgrounds, and how best to 
rectify them. Although perhaps painful for many EU member-states, failure to view the di-
visions inherent within their own territory will lead to the recurrence of issues of terrorism. 
An approach which encompasses these points, as well as the societal consensus on the issue 
of terrorism, is ultimately necessary in order to provide the Union with an anti-terrorism 
policy which is both effective in apprehending and convicting suspects, and remains within 
bounds of the fundamental rights of the EU charter. 
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